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INTRODUCTION: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE U.S. PATENT 
SYSTEM 
 
Megan M. La Belle+ 
For more than a decade now, the topics of innovation policy and patent reform 
have been priorities among U.S. lawmakers.  In the early 2000s, the conversation 
focused on concerns about our patent system impeding innovation because it 
was “too strong.”1  Innovators, particularly in the high-tech industry, claimed 
that non-practicing entities or “trolls” were using junk patents to force operating 
companies into nuisance settlements by threatening infringement suits and 
permanent injunctions.2  These threats distracted companies like Google and 
Facebook from what they should be focused on—namely, the creation and 
development of beneficial consumer products and services—or so the story 
went.  Consequently, in September 2011, Congress passed the America Invents 
Act (AIA), a comprehensive law that overhauled the U.S. patent system.3 
Since the AIA became effective in 2012, it has been easier to invalidate 
patents.4  This is due, in large part, to the creation of new administrative 
proceedings at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), particularly inter 
partes review . These post-grant proceedings allow patents to be invalidated in 
a quicker and cheaper manner than pre-AIA, when patents were primarily 
challenged in federal court.5  In addition to the changes wrought by the AIA, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has issued key decisions regarding patentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 that arguably have undermined the strength of the U.S. 
patent system.6 
Earlier this year, the International IP Commercialization Council (IIPCC) 
hosted a conference titled Meeting the Challenges to America’s Economic 
Future: Charting the Course in U.S. Intellectual Property and Innovation Policy 
that explored these topics.  As the conference transcripts published herein 
reflect, many stakeholders are worried that our innovation ecosystem is at risk 
                                               
+ Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad  
Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005, at 10, 12. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 35 U.S.C.). 
 4. See, e.g., Brian J. Love & Shawn Amwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the 
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 100–01 (2014) (discussing how many patent claims 
have been successfully challenged through post-grant review proceedings at PTO). 
 5. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of 
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 653 (2012) (explaining that Congress created post-grant review 
proceedings to provide a cheaper and more efficient alternative to litigation). 
 6. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 537 U.S. 208, 221 (2014). 
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because the pendulum has swung too far against the protection of patent rights.7  
Yet, others believe that the AIA is operating exactly how Congress intended and 
is creating a more balanced patent system that facilitates and encourages 
innovation.8  With various legislative proposals introduced over the past few 
years—including the Support Technology & Research for Our Nation’s Growth 
and Economic Resilience (STRONGER) Patents Act9 and the Targeting Rogue 
and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act10—Congress will have to decide what reforms 
to our patent system, if any, are necessary to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.”11 
I. THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM OF THE PAST 
The patent system in the U.S. is as old as the nation itself.12  Over the past two 
centuries, the country has experienced periods of stronger and weaker patent 
protection. The 1970s, for example, was a “low water mark” for patent rights 
thus prompting Congress to create the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in 1982.13  The Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent cases, heralded a new era of protectionism for patent rights that persisted 
until the AIA was passed in 2011. 
For the first two decades after its creation, the Federal Circuit consistently 
issued decisions favoring patent owners thereby establishing the U.S. as a 
stronghold of patent protection.  Without cataloguing each of these decisions, a 
few key ones are worth mentioning.  Early on, in Smith International, Inc. v. 
Hughes Tool Co.,14 the Federal Circuit announced a rule for near automatic 
injunctions upon a finding of patent infringement.15  As a result, patent owners 
were armed with a powerful bargaining tool (i.e., the threat of a permanent 
injunction) that could be used to secure license fees and settlements.16  What is 
more, just two years after its creation, the Federal Circuit made it much more 
difficult to invalidate patents on obviousness grounds by adopting the “teaching-
                                               
 7. See infra. 
 8. Id. (discussing arguments’ of AIA supporters). 
 9. Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience 
(STRONGER) Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. (2018); S. 1390, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 10. Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act, H.R. 6370, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 
2045, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 12. Id.; Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–112 (1790). 
 13. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 14. 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 15. Id. at 1581 (“A court should not be reluctant to use its equity powers once a party has so 
clearly established his patent rights.  We hold that where validity and continuing infringement have 
been clearly established . . . immediate irreparable harm is presumed.”). 
 16. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (stating that patentees can employ injunctions ”as a bargaining tool to charge 
exorbitant [licensing] fees”). 
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suggestion-motivation” test.17  The court also expanded the scope of § 101, most 
notably in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group18 where 
it decided that business methods were patentable subject matter.  This led to a 
significant increase in the number—and many believe a decrease in the 
quality—of patents granted by the PTO each year.19  Finally, but perhaps most 
importantly, the Federal Circuit ensured its position as the primary policymaker 
in the patent arena when it held that the PTO lacked substantive rulemaking 
authority and refused to afford deference to the agency’s legal determinations.20 
These and other Federal Circuit decisions created an environment ripe for 
abuse.  With the more relaxed standards for obviousness and subject matter 
eligibility, the number of patent applications filed, as well as patents ultimately 
granted by the PTO, rapidly increased.21  During this time, the PTO was severely 
under-resourced and patents were mistakenly granted.22  Rather than 
commercializing those inventions, however, “bad” patents were often sold to 
entities that enforce patents through licensing and litigation, but don’t practice 
them.23  These entities—alternatively referred to as patent enforcement entities 
(PAEs), non-practicing entities, and trolls—posed serious “holdup” problems 
for operating companies, particularly in the high tech sector.24  The PAE 
business model, in essence, was to acquire low-value patents, and then demand 
that accused infringers take a license or face an infringement suit and a 
permanent injunction.25  Because injunctions were virtually guaranteed under 
Federal Circuit law and patent suits were time-consuming, unpredictable, and 
expensive to defend, accused infringers often capitulated to PAEs and took 
licenses or settled.26 
                                               
 17. ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp. 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (“Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce 
the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination.”). 
 18. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 19. See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle & Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Banks and Business 
Method Patents, 16 U. PENN. J. BUS. LAW 431, 448–50 (2014). 
 20. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 21. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963–2015 
(last modified Dec. 14, 2018), available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (reflecting a significant jump in the 
number of patents issued in the late 1990s after State Street was decided). 
 22. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 
EMORY L.J. 181, 181–82 (2008). 
 23. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459 (2012). 
 24. Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement 
Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909, 931 (2009) (defining patent holdup as “the opportunistic use of 
patent rights to extract above-benchmark compensation”). 
 25. Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 
401 (2014). 
 26. Id. 
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This patent holdup problem spurred a call for reform.27  Beginning in 2005, 
various bills were introduced in Congress to overhaul the patent system, but they 
died in committee.28  Legislative reform efforts intensified the following year, 
and ultimately culminated in Congress enacting the AIA on September 16, 
2011.29  To be sure, the impact of the AIA has been significant, as discussed 
below.  Yet, even before the landmark legislation passed, the courts were 
effecting major change in patent doctrine.  Specifically, the Supreme Court made 
it harder for patent owners to defend against declaratory judgment actions30 and 
get permanent injunctions,31 and made it easier for accused infringers to prove 
that patented inventions were obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 10332 or lacked proper 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.33  Thus, by the time the AIA went into 
effect in 2012, the U.S. patent system already looked markedly different than it 
had just a decade before. 
II. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM 
The AIA, the most comprehensive patent reform legislation since 1952, 
fundamentally altered the way patents are issued and litigated in this country.  
For starters, it switched our priority system from “first-to-invent” to “first-to-
file,” bringing the U.S. more in harmony with the rest of the world.34  The new 
law also expanded the definition of prior art to include public disclosures outside 
the U.S.,35 created a new defense to patent infringement of prior commercial 
use,36 and gave the United States Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) greater 
control over its fees.37  Arguably more significant than any of these changes, 
however, was the AIA’s creation of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) 
and various administrative proceedings for challenging patent validity ex post, 
                                               
 27. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (2014). 
 28. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 
FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 439 (2012). 
 29. Id. 
 30. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007) (rejecting “the 
Federal Circuit’s ‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test,” and thus making it easier for alleged 
infringers to challenge patents via declaratory relief). 
 31. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006) (rejecting the Federal 
Circuit’s “general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement”). 
 32. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007) (holding that the Federal 
Circuit’s “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test for obviousness should be flexibly applied, not 
as “rigid and mandatory formulas”). 
 33. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 34. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(a), 125 Stat. 284–341 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 35 U.S.C.). 
 35. Id. § 3(b). 
 36. Id. § 5(a), § 273(a). 
 37. See, e.g., id. § 10(a) (allowing PTO to “set or adjust by rule any fee” for patent-related 
services or materials provided that any such change is used “to recover the aggregate estimated 
costs to the Office for processing, activities, services, and materials relating to patents”). 
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meaning after patents had already been granted.38  These new proceedings, 
which include inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and covered 
business method review (CBM), were supposed to simplify patent litigation by 
providing a quicker and less expensive means for invalidating bad patents.39  As 
one Federal Circuit judge explained it, “[t]he premise [was] that an adversarial 
evidentiary proceeding in the PTO [would] reliably resolve most issues of patent 
validity, without the expense and delay of district court litigation, and sometimes 
even before infringement has occurred.”40 
The PTAB opened its doors in September 2012, immediately went to work, 
and has kept busy ever since.  As of July 2018, a total of 8,874 post-grant 
petitions had been filed (8,190 IPRs, 557 CBMs, and 127 PGRs), far exceeding 
expectations about how attractive these proceedings would be to patent 
challengers.41  One reason these proceedings have been so popular is because of 
the early success that challengers enjoyed.  By way of example, a 2014 study 
showed that petitioners in IPRs were winning complete victories almost two-
thirds of the time when they pursued petitions to a final decision.42  These early 
statistics caused some, including the former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit 
Randall Rader—one of the speakers at the IIPCC conference43—to view the 
PTAB as a “death squad”44 and a “killing field”45 whose inclination to invalidate 
patents undermines our economy by discouraging investment in innovation and 
technology.46  What is more, critics have denounced the PTAB for complicating 
patent litigation rather than streamlining it, as Congress intended.47  Rader and 
                                               
 38. Id. §§ 6, 7, 18 at 299–316, 329–31. 
 39. See Matal, supra note 5, at 653. 
 40. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., 
dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
 41. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: 
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 251 (2015) (“[T]hese statistics 
speak loudly about the public’s eagerness and ability to use these procedures to ‘weed out’ bad 
patents.”). 
 42. See Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the 
Numbers, 81 U. CHI L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 101 (2014). 
 43. See infra at 627. 
 44. Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are all Commercially Viable Patents 
Invalid?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-death-
squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48642/ (quoting the comments of former 
Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader made at the 2013 AIPLA annual meeting in Washington, 
D.C.). 
 45. Erich Spangenberg, Patent Predictions for 2015, IPNAV BLOG (Jan. 2015), 
http://www.ipnav.com/blog/erich-spangenbergs-patent-predictions-for-2015/. 
 46. See, e.g., A. Abbott, et al., Crippling the Innovation Economy: Regulatory Overreach at 
the Patent Office, REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Aug. 14, 
2017), https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Intellectual-Property-Working-Group-
Paper.pdf. 
 47. See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, M.D., Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 883 (2015) 
(“[M]ore opportunities to challenge issued patents also means more opportunities to engage in 
abusive practices to undermine legitimate patent rights.”) 
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Paul Michel, also a former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, both addressed 
that point at the conference, claiming that PTAB proceedings complicate patent 
litigation—for example, by using different standards than courts for claim 
construction and burden of proof—thus driving up costs by a significant 
margin.48  Finally, detractors argue that the PTAB has failed to solve the patent 
troll problem, and instead has besieged operating companies, undermined the 
federal courts’ role in patent law, and hampered innovation in the U.S.49 
These critiques of the PTAB were explored in depth at the IIPCC conference.  
Speakers talked about how the increased risk of patent invalidation is 
discouraging research, development, and investment in innovation.  
Representatives from a cross-section of patent owners—the Cleveland Clinic, 
University of Michigan, IBM, Qualcomm, and Personalized Media 
Communications (PMC)—shared stories about how recent changes to the patent 
system are negatively impacting innovators “on the ground.”50  Aaric Eisenstein, 
Vice President of Licensing Strategy for PMC, explained how repeated PTAB 
challenges cause significant strain on innovators, especially the individual 
inventors his company serves.  More fundamentally, Eisenstein and others 
complain, the PTAB undermines the PTO’s primary mission: issuing patents.51 
Yet the stories shared at the IIPCC conference did not focus exclusively, or 
even primarily, on the PTAB.  Instead, much of the discussion was devoted to 
two other issues wholly unrelated to the AIA: patentable subject matter under 
35 U.S.C. § 101 and permanent injunctions in patent cases.  As noted above, 
before Congress enacted the AIA, the Supreme Court undertook patent reform 
on its own by issuing a number of landmark decisions.52  In a similar vein, the 
Supreme Court continued to tweak the patent system after the AIA, particularly 
with respect to § 101 in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.,53 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
                                               
 48. See infra at 627 (“The PTAB, quite aside from invalidations, adds per challenge 
something in the order of $300 to $600 thousand dollars per challenge and there are often multiple 
challenges.”) (Michel, P.); id. (“In many instances, [PTAB review] has added to the expense and 
the time of the proceeding without any real concomitant benefit.”) (Rader, R.). 
 49. Id. (“[The PTAB] hasn’t even hit the main target it was supposed to hit, which is the patent 
troll case.”); id. at 628 (“[I]t seems to me the measure of accuracy and fairness—due process, if 
you will—in a PTAB should be by comparing it to what happens in a court of law.”) (Michel, P.); 
see also Abbott, supra note 46, at 4 (“The PTAB administrative tribunal is creating unnecessary 
costs for inventors and companies, and thus it is harming the innovation economy far beyond the 
harm of the bad patents it was created to remedy.”). 
 50. See infra at 634–645. 
 51. Id. at 639 (stating that the PTO “is directed to issuing valid patents.  That’s what it’s for.”); 
see also Ryan Davis, PTAB’s “Death Squad” Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief 
Says, LAW360 (Aug. 14, 2014, 5:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-
squadlabelnot-totally-off-base-chief-says (quoting Randall Rader as saying that the PTO “was in 
tension with itself, with thousand[s] of examiners ‘giving birth’ to patents and hundreds of judges 
on the PTAB ‘acting as death squads, kind of killing property rights’”). 
 52. See supra notes 30–33. 
 53. 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
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Inc.,54 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.55  This trilogy of cases 
reinvigorated the judicially-created exceptions to § 101—i.e., that laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are excluded from patent 
protection—and attempted to set out a framework for determining when the 
exceptions apply.56  Specifically, the Alice test requires courts to ask, first, 
whether the claims at issue are directed to a “patent-ineligible concept,” meaning 
one of the judicially-created exceptions.57  If so, then is there an element or 
combination of elements in the claim that amounts to “significantly more than a 
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”?58  With respect to this second prong, 
courts consider, inter alia, whether the invention’s functions are “‘well-
understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the 
industry.”59 
As a result of this trilogy of cases, it became easier than ever to invalidate 
patents under § 101, often at much earlier stages of litigation.60  Jeff Cicarella, 
for instance, explained how patents owned by the Cleveland Clinic on an 
important diagnostic tool were invalidated at the pleading stage under Mayo 
without claim construction or consideration of expert testimony.61  Manny 
Schecter opined that recent § 101 jurisprudence has created major obstacles for 
companies like IBM working in Artificial Intelligence (AI) because AI 
“intersects with the judicial exception on abstractness but the Supreme Court has 
never ever told us what  abstractness means.”62  While the speakers recognize 
that the Federal Circuit and PTO are doing their best to bring some clarity to § 
101, they seem to agree that legislation is necessary at this point.63   Indeed, 
some believe that the best legislative fix would be for Congress to eliminate the 
judicially-created exceptions to § 101.64 
                                               
 54. 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
 55. 537 U.S. 208 (2014) 
 56. See, e.g., Amy Landers, The Interconnections Between Entrepreneurship, Science, and 
the Patent System, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 631, 634 (2016); Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming 
Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 647 (2018). 
 57. Alice, 537 U.S. at 217. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 225 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). 
 60. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 651 (2018) 
(“[T]he invigorated patent eligibility requirement is, like Congress’s expansion of post-issuance 
proceedings at the PTO, another route to quick decisions on patent validity.”). 
 61. See infra at 642–43. 
 62. Id. at 635. 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 625 (acknowledging that there have been some “good panel decisions[s] 
of…the Federal Circuit” on § 101 issues, but “despite [the Federal Circuit’s] best efforts to cope,” 
there’s “chaos up and down the Courts”) (Kappos, D.); id. at 629 (“The [Patent] Office is doing 
everything it can to fix what it can fix, but legislation is needed to help fix other aspects of the 
system that were wired in by the AIA and we now know need to be adjusted . . . .”) (Kappos, D.). 
 64. Id. at 644 (“I like the idea I heard in the first panel about the legislative revision to 101 to 
do away with the exceptions to create clarity.”) (Pilz, B.). 
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Aside from patentable subject matter, the other topic that received a good deal 
of attention at the IIPCC conference was injunctive relief—again, something 
unrelated to the AIA.  During the push for patent reform, one of the primary 
complaints from accused infringers was that patent trolls were using the threat 
of permanent injunctions to extort settlements.65  Such threats were effective 
because, under Federal Circuit law at the time, injunctive relief was almost 
automatic once infringement had been established.66  Thus, the earliest patent 
reform bill proposed to limit injunctive relief by requiring the court to “consider 
the fairness of the remedy in light of all the facts and the relevant interests of the 
parties associated with the invention.”67  Congress never had the opportunity to 
act on this proposal, however, because the Supreme Court decided eBay v. 
MercExchange68 in 2006, less than a year after the first reform bill was 
introduced. The eBay Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s automatic injunction 
rule and held that courts must consider the traditional four-factor standard for 
permanent injunctions in all types of cases.69  As a consequence of eBay, it has 
become much more difficult for patent owners to obtain permanent 
injunctions.70  In Paul Michel’s words, it is “almost impossible” to get a 
permanent injunction in the U.S. today, whereas injunctive relief is routine in 
other parts of the world.71  Laurie Self, Vice President and Counsel for 
Government Affairs at Qualcomm, likewise claims that “we are now in a strange 
dynamic where it’s easier to get an injunction in China than it is in the United 
States.”72  In fact, Self believes the inability to obtain injunctive relief is the 
biggest problem facing patent owners today.73 
As you read the transcripts from the IIPCC conference and hear more about 
the problems with the current patent system in the U.S., keep in mind that—as 
is usually the case—there are two sides to the story.  The changes that have come 
about in recent years were motivated, in large part, by evidence that the former 
patent system was inefficient, subject to abuse by trolls, and often unfair to 
                                               
 65. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation As an Effective Strategy Against 
Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 166 (2006) (“[A] 
patent troll makes heavy use of the threat of litigation—and the threat of an injunction—to force a 
license of its patent.”). 
 66. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.2d 1266, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 67. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 7. 
 68. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 69. Id. at 391–92.  The four factors include: (1) patent owner has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering 
the balance of hardships between plaintiff and defendant, injunctive relief is warranted; and (4) 
public interest would not be disserved by an injunction.  Id. at 391. 
 70. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1313, 1317 (2017) (discussing the difficulty of obtaining injunctions post-eBay). 
 71. See infra at 626. 
 72. Id. at 644. 
 73. Id. 
2018] Meeting the Challenges to America's Economic Future 615 
accused infringers.74  If the current climate is less favorable to patent owners, 
supporters argue, that simply means the legislative and judicial reforms are 
working as intended.  With respect to the PTAB, for example, its purpose was 
to provide an expert tribunal that “facilitate[s] both the validation of properly 
issued patents and the elimination of invalid patents.”75  As the former Chief 
Judge of the PTAB said in response to criticism from Radar and others that the 
tribunal was invalidating too many patents, if the PTAB was not “doing some 
‘death squadding,’ [it] would not be doing what the [AIA] calls on [the PTAB] 
to do.”76  Moreover, while the PTAB initially invalidated patent claims at a 
seemingly high rate, the pace has slowed, suggesting that the worst of the bad 
patents were quickly and easily invalidated in the early years of the PTAB—
exactly the result Congress hoped to achieve.77  Perhaps more importantly, data 
indicate that the PTAB’s invalidation rate is actually quite similar to that of its 
European counterpart and U.S. district courts, thus undermining the claim that 
the PTAB is a “death squad.”78 
Turning to the issues of § 101 and permanent injunctions, there are also 
arguments on both sides about the impact of the recent changes.  For a long time, 
courts broadly interpreted the judicially-created exceptions to § 101 (i.e., laws 
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas) to preclude the patenting of 
business methods,79 computer software,80 and certain types of innovations in 
                                               
 74. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle 
Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1676 (2007) (discussing how the threat of injunctions gives 
patentees “highly disproportionate leverage over . . . accused infringer[s]” and how “[c]urrent 
institutional arrangements do not make it easy for companies to challenge the validity of ‘mistake’ 
patents”). 
 75. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d, 
SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the 
Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
235, 236 (2015) (explaining that Congress created post-grant review proceedings to “improve the 
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innovation caused by patent thickets”). 
 76. Ryan Davis, PTAB’s “Death Squad” Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW 360, 
Aug. 14, 2014. 
 77. See, e.g., Brian Berliner, Sina Aria & Alex Boyadjian, Busting 3 Myths About the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board, LAW 360, Aug. 9, 2018 (arguing that PTAB data shows that “AIA 
proceedings have been sufficiently fair to patent owners”). 
 78. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, & David L. Schwartz, Our Divided Patent System, 
87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (2015); Josh Landau, A Little More than Forty Percent: Outcomes at the 
PTAB, District Court, and the EPO, PATENT PROGRESS (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.patentprogress.org/2018/05/01/a-little-more-than-forty-percent/. 
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biotechnology.81  That began to change in the 1980s and continued for the next 
decade or so as the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit broadened the scope 
of what’s patentable under § 101,82 thus leading to a proliferation of new patents 
granted by the PTO.83  When the Internet bubble burst in the 2000s, many of 
these software and business method patents were acquired by PAEs and 
enforced in unscrupulous ways, as discussed earlier.84 During that same time 
frame, concerns were mounting that some biotechnology patents were harming 
patients and impeding innovation.85  It was these circumstances that led to the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo, Myriad, and Alice in an attempt to bring 
some balance back to our patent system. 
Like the broad scope of § 101, the ease with which patent owners could get 
permanent injunctions was another primary impetus for patent reform.86  The 
PAEs who acquired software and business method patents in the early 2000s 
used those patents, together with the threat of an injunction, to force accused 
infringers to pay nuisance settlements.87  The Supreme Court addressed the 
injunctive relief problem in eBay, as discussed above.  And while critics contend 
that eBay has made it difficult for patent owners across-the-board to get 
permanent injunctions, a study by Professor Christopher Seaman reaches a 
different conclusion.88  Specifically, Seaman studied post-eBay patent decisions 
and concluded that district courts are systematically denying injunctive relief 
only for patent owners that do not compete directly with the accused infringer.89  
Direct competitors, by contrast, continue to seek and secure permanent 
injunctions when they have established infringement.90 
The bottom line is that our current patent system looks the way it does for a 
reason.  There was a strong consensus before the AIA that the patent system was 
out of whack and unfairly favored patent owners.  Thus, a slew of changes was 
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implemented by Congress, the courts, and the PTO in an attempt to restore 
balance to the patent system.  It is possible, of course, that the pendulum has 
swung too far in the other direction and patent owners are now at a distinct 
disadvantage for the reasons discussed at the IIPCC conference.  Yet, 
bombarding the system with a whole host of new changes is not the solution to 
this problem.  Instead, a piecemeal approach—which is already underway—is 
more likely to achieve the balance necessary for a well-functioning patent 
system.91 
III. THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM 
When Donald Trump became President, it was predicted that the tenor of 
discussions on innovation policy would shift in a pro-patent owner direction.92  
In the two years since the election, those predictions have proven accurate.  
Evidence of this shift includes recent statements by the Head of DOJ’s Antitrust 
Division that “patent holders rarely create antitrust concerns,”93 and Trump’s 
ceremonial signing of the ten millionth patent issued by the PTO.94  Still, the 
clearest indicator of the Trump administration’s patent policy priorities has 
appropriately come from the PTO Director, Andrei Iancu, himself.95 
Shortly after he assumed office in early 2018, Iancu declared that the patent 
system is at a crossroads, and that “we cannot continue down the same path if 
we want to maintain our economic leadership.”96  Iancu then set out two 
principal policy objectives: first, increasing the reliability of the patent grant, 
and second, creating a dialogue that is pro-innovation and pro-patents.97  At the 
IIPCC conference, the Director re-emphasized this latter point about the 
narrative surrounding the patent system,98 while simultaneously stressing the 
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need for balance.99 More recently, however, Iancu’s remarks have taken a 
decidedly pro-patent owner turn.  In a talk to the Eastern District of Texas Bar 
Association, Iancu called patent troll concerns “Orwellian ‘doublespeak’”100 and 
issued a warning: 
In our zeal to eliminate “trolls” and “the bad patents” they allegedly 
use to terrorize society, we have overcorrected and risk throwing out 
the baby with the bathwater.  This must now end, and we must restore 
balance to our system….  [S]caring our inventors and our 
entrepreneurs is harmful. And scaring our government officials drives 
towards over-broad policies that, on balance, inhibit innovation.101 
Iancu criticized those who complain about trolls as anti-innovation, and 
proclaimed that the PTO is now focused on inventors and the benefits they 
bestow on the public.102 
More important than these platitudes, however, are the key policy initiatives 
that Iancu has implemented at the PTO.  For one, shortly after Iancu took the 
helm, the PTO issued guidance to its examining corps on § 101 based on a recent 
Federal Circuit decision in  Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,103 which provided some 
clarity on how to apply the second prong of the Alice test.104  While it’s too soon 
to understand the full impact of the Berkheimer memo, it is expected to 
counteract the Myriad/Mayo/Alice trilogy of cases and allow more patent 
applications to pass muster under § 101.105  Indeed, early data indicate that is 
precisely what’s happening, as the PTAB is overturning significantly more § 101 
rejections than before Berkheimer.106 
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In addition to addressing § 101, the PTO has also effected important changes 
with respect to PTAB.  By way of example, the PTO has amended the PTAB 
Trial Practice Guide to allow patentees to file sur-replies as a matter of right, 
effectively granting them the “last word” in PTAB proceedings before the oral 
hearing.107  Even more significant, the day before the IIPCC conference, the 
PTO proposed new rules regarding the claim construction standard that PTAB 
should use. 108 Having received and considered hundreds of comments, the 
agency subsequently promulgated the claim construction rules, which became 
effective on November 13, 2018.109  In short, the new rules mandate that PTAB 
interpret disputed patent claim terms in accordance with Phillips v. AWH 
Corp.110—the same standard that district courts use—rather than the “broadest 
reasonable interpretation” standard that PTAB had been using before.111  As with 
the changes to § 101, only time will tell the extent to which this new standard 
has affected PTAB proceedings.  But the expectation is that the Phillips standard 
will make it somewhat more difficult to challenge patents in IPR, and thus patent 
owners should gain from this switch.112 
Along with the PTO, the courts have taken steps that may very well shift the 
tide in favor of patent owners.  Specifically, the Federal Circuit and Supreme 
Court have issued opinions in crucial cases that inure to the benefit of patent 
owners.  As mentioned above, Berkheimer has made it more difficult to 
invalidate patents under § 101, particularly at an early stage of the proceeding, 
because the Federal Circuit held that the second prong of the Alice test—
“[w]hether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled 
artisan at the time of the patent”—is a question of fact that must be proven by 
clear and convincing evidence.113  The court went on to explain that “[t]he mere 
fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior art . . . does not mean it was 
well-understood, routine, and conventional.”114  In other words, the court 
clarified, proving the second prong of the Alice test takes more than showing 
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that the technology was publicly available.115  Thus, although the ultimate § 101 
question is a legal one, there are factual determinations underpinning that 
decision that frequently cannot be made at the pleadings or summary judgment 
stage of a lawsuit.116  Assuming it remains good law,117 Berkheimer will push  § 
101 decisions later in the litigation—a welcome change for patent owners.118 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu119 is 
also likely to move patent policy in a pro-patent owner direction.120  SAS held 
that when the PTAB institutes an inter partes review, it must issue a final written 
decision addressing the patentability of all of the claims the petitioner has 
challenged.121  This means that partial institutions are no longer permitted, which 
may well cause PTAB to institute fewer IPRs in the first place as a way of 
managing its workload.122  And even when the PTAB does institute IPR, patent 
owners should still benefit because the final decision will likely uphold the 
patentability of some of the challenged claims.  Due to the AIA’s estoppel 
provisions, those patent claims upheld by the PTAB should then be immune 
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from further challenge.123  Simply put, SAS has put “greater teeth” into the PTAB 
estoppel provisions in a way that will favor patent owners.124 
It is possible, of course, that these changes—the new claim construction 
standard, Berkheimer, and SAS—will not have the positive effect for patent 
owners that many have predicted.125  But they could, and it’s simply too early to 
know for sure.  What we do know, however, is that making a bunch of changes 
to the patent system at once—which is arguably what happened leading up to 
the AIA—can swing the pendulum too far in the other direction.  While 
legislation like the STRONGER Patents Act may be attractive in theory, there is 
little chance that such a major overhaul would achieve the delicate balance that 
our patent system requires.126  The better approach, which is well underway 
since Director Iancu took office, is incremental reform led by the PTO—the 
entity that should serve as the nation’s primary policymaker on innovation.127  
Admittedly, this takes more time and patience than comprehensive reform like 
the STRONGER Patents Act, and thus is less responsive to the short-term 
interests of certain stakeholders.128 Yet for the public—the primary beneficiary 
of our patent system129—history makes clear that it’s the right path to take.130 
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